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The JPE Commission
Toward a More Transparent and Informative Evaluation

The JPE commission is the key player in the JPE process. The commission generally has very few binding
rules to follow and thus has a great deal of discretion in how to proceed. This preliminary investigation
suggests the JPE commissions may be relying heavily on the attorney surveys to identify recipients of
negative recommendations.
by Rebecca D. Gill and Kenneth J. Retzl

Introduction

One of the important innovations of
the merit system of judicial selection is its attempt to maintain electoral accountability for judges while
removing the need for judges to
square off head-to-head in competitive elections. The retention
elections used by most merit plan
systems allow citizens the opportunity to remove underperforming
judges at the ballot box. At the same
time, they are designed in the hopes
of minimizing the need for campaigning and fundraising that competitive
elections increasingly require.1
A side effect of the absence of significant campaigning, however, is
that the voter is left with precious
little information with which to evaluate judges standing for retention. 2
In contested elections, the campaign process provides information
to voters about both the challenger
and the incumbent. 3 The challenger
in the race has a strong incentive to
make public whatever shortcomings the incumbent judge may have.
Indeed, challengers typically seek
out weak incumbents in the hopes
that they will stand a better chance
of winning.4 As a result, the public
is exposed to information about an
incumbent’s less impressive record.
Where there is no challenger, there is
no significant campaign, and voters
get little information about the
incumbent. Turnout in these uncontested elections is low, and ballot

roll-off is high.5
The same lack of information
plagues retention elections, which
are uncontested by definition.
Perhaps this is one reason very few
judges lose retention elections. Previous research has indicated less
than 1 percent of judges have been
removed from the bench due to a
failed retention election.6 States
with retention elections have recognized this problem. The most important step these states have taken to
counteract this dearth of information is the creation of formal, statesponsored judicial performance
evaluation (JPE) programs. These
programs, universally modeled
after the American Bar Association’s
Guidelines for the Evaluation of Judicial Perfomance,7 aspire to provide
useful, fair, and relevant information
for voters to use when making voting
decisions.
This research aims to determine
whether JPE programs are actually
providing useful, fair, and relevant
information by discussing JPEs in
general and specifically analyzing
Colorado’s process of judicial evaluation. What we find is that Colorado’s
evaluation tool suffers from gender
bias, resulting in lower scores for
female judges when we control for
other mitigating factors. We urge all
JPE programs to continue to monitor
and evaluate their programs to guard
against such bias. We agree with
David Brody’s claim that some inforWWW.AJS.ORG
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courtroom observations and/or
interviews with the judges themselves).
Although some observers have
dismissed “the concerns about the
subjectivity of legitimate evaluation factors” as “infinitesimal,”17
most proponents of JPE systems
have long recognized the importance of addressing concerns about
the “fairness of survey methodologies and evaluation commission procedures.”18 The judicial evaluation
system in Colorado, and others of
its kind, grew out of a self-conscious
attempt to achieve both precision
and fairness. Supporters of the model
saw Colorado’s JPE system as nearly
ideal, anticipating that it would serve
as a model for other states to follow.19
Currently, 18 merit plan states
and the District of Columbia have a
formal, state-sponsored JPE system
in place, although Colorado’s system
is still considered the most comprehensive in the nation.20 These
systems are all derived from recommendations contained in the ABA
Guidelines,21 although states vary
widely in terms of their adoption of
the more complicated and expensive
recommendations provided in the
reports. All of these programs have
a few important characteristics in
common: They are organized as commissions that are state sanctioned as
the official evaluating body for state
judges; each uses at least one survey
instrument to solicit evaluations of
the judges from people outside the
commission; they publish at least
some of their findings for public consumption; and each contains some
type of judicial self-improvement
component.22

mation can be seen as better than no
information to assist voters make
retention decisions.8 However, we
also agree with Christine Durham’s
claim that “we are expending too
much time, money, and institutional
credibility if the results (of JPEs) are
contaminated by bias and are, therefore, unreliable.”9 Our hope is that
this research can begin a discussion
to make reliable and effective JPEs a
reality.

The Basics of Judicial Performance
Evaluation

JPEs are a critical component of judicial selection, especially in states
that hold retention elections for
their judges. The presence of JPEs
fulfills a number of important functions. First, JPEs provide voters with
needed information to use when
casting their ballots in a judicial election.10 The hope is that this information will turn retention elections into
a viable tool for providing meaningful accountability.11 Second, it can
be an important tool for protecting
the quality of judges on the bench
by incentivizing self-improvement.12
Finally, proponents argue that statesponsored JPE systems can educate
the public about the state justice
system, increasing the legitimacy of
the state courts.13
While JPEs do provide a very
valuable service to judges, lawyers,
public officials, and voters, there is a
question of whether such measures
impede judicial independence. It can
be argued that judicial independence
is retained so long as evaluations are
free of critiques of outcomes of specific cases.14 However, with any sort of
survey instrument, respondents can
use the survey to rate judges lower
than actually warranted because of
a (perceived) poor outcome in a specific case.15 Or, sometimes judges will
only be evaluated by individuals who
feel the judge deserves criticism,
while those who feel the judge is satisfactorily completing his duties will
neglect to complete an evaluation.16
These concerns are easily overcome
with information that is included in
the performance evaluation that is
not derived from survey data (like
2 JUDICATURE
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In 2005, the ABA released its Guidelines for the Evaluation of Judicial
Performance.23 These Guidelines
urge all court systems to create
an evaluation program, and they
provide standards for the process.
The main purpose of these systems
is to promote self-improvement of
judges, improve the overall quality
of judges, and to provide information
to individuals responsible for decidV O L 9 8 NO 1

ing whether to reappoint, retain, or
reelect judges.24 The ABA envisioned
the JPE commission to be the central
figure in this process. The commissions are charged with developing an
evaluation program, administering
it, gathering the required information, and analyzing and presenting
the results. According to the ABA,
the creation and staffing of JPE commissions should be the responsibility of the highest court or another
“constitutionally mandated body.”25
In instances where these institutions have not created judicial performance commissions, the ABA
envisions the state bar association developing its own evaluation
methods.26
The criteria to evaluate judges
are explicit. Judges should be evaluated on their legal ability, integrity,
impartiality, communication skills,
professionalism,
temperament,
administrative capacity, and any
other criteria specific to jurisdiction or level of court that is deemed
appropriate.27 Those who should
be consulted during the evaluation
process include judges, lawyers, and
members of the public that are familiar with the system (e.g., jurors, staff
members, witnesses, members of law
enforcement, etc.).28 Unfortunately,
the methodology for evaluating
judges is less clear. Currently, there
is no universal template, so states
are left to devise their own evaluation instruments. The only guidance
given by the ABA is to utilize experts
when developing the evaluation
tools.29
There is one recommendation provided by the ABA that we
believe has not been completed as
diligently as necessary. According to
the ABA, once evaluation programs
are created and implemented, they
should be evaluated periodically to
ensure the information obtained is
reliable and unbiased. 30 In light of
recent research that has indicated
there is significant bias in several
JPEs, 31 it is critical that commissions and legislatures redouble their
efforts to guard against any inherent
unfairness and biases in their programs. By standardizing the work of

commissions, their output can focus
on the production of reliable voter
information instead of the all-ornothing recommendation that has
come to dominate JPE reports.

The Case of Colorado

Colorado’s JPE system is the most
expensive and ambitious of its kind. 32
It attempts a “360- degree” review33
process by including a number of
different metrics and constituencies in its evaluation process. The
judges are selected through a merit
system. By law, each judge serves an
initial term of two years and must
stand for retention during the next
general election. In advance of these
elections, each justice on the ballot
undergoes a review process. These
evaluations are conducted by the
Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation.
The
uniquely
decentralized
system is a hallmark of Colorado’s
JPE commissions. The commissions
were created by law in 1988 “for the
purpose of providing voters with
fair, responsible and constructive
evaluations of judges and justices
seeking retention.”34 The 22 judicial
districts in Colorado each have their
own commissions. Figure 1 shows a
map of these districts. A statewide
commission evaluates judges on the
supreme court and court of appeals.
PN: [Figure 1 about here]
The commissions are made up of
both attorneys and non-attorneys.
The representation of laypeople on
the commissions has been hailed
from the beginning as an important
contributor to the legitimacy and
fairness of the evaluation process. 35
Each member is appointed by an
officer of state government: the governor, the chief justice, the speaker
of the house, or the president of the
senate. Each appointed commissioner serves a four-year term that is
once renewable.
The commissions evaluate all
judges on several dimensions of judicial performance, each derived from
WWW.AJS.ORG
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the ABA’s Guidelines. 36 These performance categories include integrity,
legal knowledge, communication
skills, judicial temperament, administrative performance, and service to
the legal profession and the public.
The commissioners are instructed
to use a number of different sources
of information in their evaluations,
including surveys of attorneys and
non-attorneys, a judge’s self-evaluation, interviews with the judge,
written judicial decisions, courtroom observation, and administrative statistics.
The commissions weigh a number
of pieces of evidence in their deliberations, all of which must be shared
with the judge evaluated. However,
only a few components of the commission deliberations are ever made
public via the official website37: a
short narrative, the aggregate-level
results of the survey data, and the
official recommendation of the commission. Three possible recommendations exist: Retain, Do Not Retain,
and No Opinion. 38 Additionally, if the
commission believes a judge has a
significant weakness, it can recommend a performance-improvement
plan to address the area of concern.
From 2002 through 2012, the commissions evaluated 1,176 judges and
made “Do Not Retain” recommendations in 17 cases; during the same
period, a total of 10 judges lost their
retention elections. Figure 1 shows
the distribution of negative recommendations across the judicial districts.
There are many qualities about
the Colorado JPE system that should
be commended. It allows for considerable citizen input; it takes into consideration more than just attorney
surveys; it surveys laypeople and
collects additional evidence through
interviews and work product
samples; it also allows judges the
chance to evaluate themselves and
defend their performance to the
commission.
The development of Colorado’s
comprehensive
state-sponsored
JPE system was in part a reaction
to the perceived weaknesses of the
bar polls that were common in many
4 JUDICATURE

e

JULY / AUGUST 2014

e

states at the time. The independent groups pushing for a JPE overhaul argued that citizens had little
faith in these polls, largely because
“many [citizens] especially distrust
lawyers.”39 But early studies of Colorado’s system revealed some disturbing findings. About 10 years into the
system, a 1998 American Judicature
Society study surveyed Colorado
judges about their impressions of
the JPE process.40 Only 61 percent of
the judges agreed or strongly agreed
with the following statements:
1) “I have an adequate opportunity
to respond to commission results
before they are made public”;
2) “The overall process used by
the evaluation commission to collect
information about my performance
is fair.”
Only about 30 percent of judges
agreed with a third question:
3) “Judges have access to a fair
appeals process if they disagree with
the commission’s report.”
Colorado addressed the concerns
expressed by judges in question 1
and 3 above by incorporating an
enhanced process through which
judges can respond to the commission’s report in advance of its publication.41 Judges are now afforded the
opportunity to respond to unfavorable recommendations with a statement of 100 words or less, which
the commission must publish along
with its report and recommendation.
The first such response appeared in
2008.
The lackluster response to question 2 above, however, remains
largely unaddressed. In the context
of a system where judges almost universally receive “Retain” recommendations,42 it is difficult to attribute
this to sour grapes. The only specific
guidance provided to the commissions is what information must be
consulted and which qualities ought
to be considered; commissions are
on their own when it comes to determining how to interpret, weight, and
assemble this information.43
To be sure, the commissions still
rarely give “Do Not Retain” recommendations; indeed, only about
one percent of the total evaluations
V O L 9 8 NO 1

completed between 2002 and 2012
resulted in this negative recommendation. In some cases these designations can seem a bit arbitrary. In one
example, a county judge was heavily
criticized by lawyers in the evaluation survey for failing to maintain a
professional demeanor in the courtroom. This judge’s retention score on
the attorney survey was 20 percent
lower than other county judges. His
commission recommended retention
despite these criticisms.44
Judges receiving negative ratings
might justly complain. In fact, all but
one of the judges who submitted a
response to a “Do Not Retain” or “No
Opinion” rating criticized the commissions’ selective use and arbitrary
inflation of negative feedback. One
judge noted that “[t]he Commission
disregarded the overall presumptive
‘retain’ score on my performance
survey results.” Another judge’s
frustration was even more forceful; she ends her response with the
typeface observation, a “MAJORITY
(78%) RECOMMENDS THAT I BE
RETAINED.”45

Unpacking the Commissions’ Ratings

It is difficult for the judges, let alone
the public, to know exactly what sort
of analysis underlies the decisions of
these commissions. Certainly this is
partly intentional, at least as it concerns the precise nature of the evidence presented to the commissions.
The rules that govern the process
require that the commission goes
into executive session for “[c]onsideration of confidential materials as
part of an evaluation of a justice or
a judge, including deliberations.”46
Indeed, Part III of the ABA Guidelines also recommends that with the
exception of the results intended for
public consumption, “the data and
results should be confidential.”47
Raw interview and courtroom
observation data are not provided to
the public, neither is the information
solicited by the commissions from
the district administrator about
“information concerning the caseload, case types, open case reports,
and case aging reports.”48 The judges
must undergo a self-evaluation as

well, but this information is also
missing from the public profile. For
appellate court judges, the writing
samples are by and large publicly
available, the exception being the
one unpublished decision appellate judges are required to submit.
However, the reports do not indicate
which opinion the judge submitted.
Perhaps more alarmingly, the rules
allow the commissions to interview
other interested persons concerning
the judge being evaluated. They are
also authorized to accept unsolicited
feedback from the public, as long as
such submission is not anonymous.49
This information is not presented in
raw form, of course, for confidentiality reasons. However, it is difficult
for the public have a sense of how
the raw data are translated into the
summary reports provided as voter
information guides.
What we can do is to use the
information we can access to determine what predicts positive recommendation results. To accomplish
this, we have assembled a dataset
that includes information from the
publicly-available survey results,
coupled with some additional measures to stand as proxies for judicial
ability. 50 Between 2002 and 2012,
the Colorado JPE commissions conducted 623 pre-election evaluations
of judges.51 Of these, five were “Do
Not Retain” recommendations, and
four were “No Opinion” recommendations. This means 98.56 percent
of all commission recommendations
were positive.
PN: [Table 1 about here]
PN: [Table 2 about here]
In Table 2, we present a number of
bivariate analyses comparing values
of some important variables for those
who get positive as opposed to negative recommendations from the commissions. We have taken data from
the publicly available performance
evaluations and supplemented it
with information from official judge
biographies and other publicly availWWW.AJS.ORG
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able information (See Table 1). The
results here show that the percentage of attorneys who recommend
retention in the attorney survey is a
strong driver of commission recommendations. In addition, judges who
are perceived to be biased52 are more
likely to be in the negative recommendation group. In the bivariate
analyses, layperson “Retain” scores
are also related to the commission’s recommendation. The average
number of years since bar admission
is slightly lower among those judges
with negative recommendations.
Finally, female judges are more likely
to receive negative recommendations. There are a total of 165 evaluations of female judges in our data.
A total of six female judges, or 3.64
percent, received negative recommendations. This is as compared
with only 0.66 percent of male judges
with negative recommendations.

“Retain” scores and the final commission recommendation. The probability of a positive recommendation
approaches 1 as the attorney retain
score approaches 100.
PN: [Figure 2 about here]
The more interesting finding is
how little impact other measurable
pieces of information have on the
process. This is especially true given
that attorney surveys have been
shown in a number of different contexts to manifest gender bias53 and
broader reliability and alidity problems, 54 even in states with sophisticated JPE systems. 55
It is important to remember, of
course, that we are talking about
an incredibly small percentage of
evaluations that result in negative
commission recommendations. Very
rarely do incumbent judges get voted
out of office56 —a fact that has been
cited as a problem with JPE commissions. In Colorado, it is quite difficult even for judges of questionable
quality to obtain a “Do Not Retain”
recommendation from the commissions. In 2012, a county judge was
criticized by attorneys for his unprofessional courtroom demeanor. The
attorney “Retain” score for this judge
was a full 20 percent lower than
the other county judges that year.
The commission expressed concern
about the official’s use of biting
sarcasm in the courtroom, but nonetheless recommended retention.
Why did this judge get a “Retain” recommendations when others did not?
It is difficult to say. In all, there were
37 evaluations out of 588 at the trial
court level where the judge scored at
least 20 percent below the average
and still received a “Retain” recommendation from the commission. 57
Unfortunately, commissions give
the public precious little information about how the recommendation decision is reached. The post
hoc justification in the commissions’
blurb gives some clues, but the commissions vary widely in their attention to detail and precision in these

PN: [Table 1 about here]

In Table 3, we report the results
of a model predicting positive commission recommendations. We use
a logistic regressional model to
estimate the probability that any
given judge will earn a positive (or
“Retain”) recommendation from the
commission.
We have clustered
the observations by judge to control
for the non-independence of multiple observations when calculating
the standard errors. In this model,
we include only trial court judges, as
attorney bias scores and layperson
“Retain” scores were not collected by
the state commission for the appellate court judges.
It is clear from this analysis that
the effects of the attorney bias scale,
the layperson “Retain” scores, and
the time on the bench were significant in the bivariate analyses only to
the degree that they overlapped with
or informed the attorney “Retain”
scores. Indeed, the summary results
of the attorney survey are the most
significant predictor of commission recommendations by far. This
is represented graphically in Figure
2. This figure shows the important relationship between attorney

6 JUDICATURE
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write-ups. Figure 3 presents a pair
of actual recommendations from
the 2012 cycle. The review of Judge
Tallman provides a good deal of
information about how the commission came to its decision to retain
the judge. The narrative discusses
potential problems with his skills,
and it details how it obtained information that mitigated the potential
problems. By contrast, the review of
Judge Lutz shares very little information about the judge. It asserts some
judicial characteristics, but it does
not make clear how the commission
would have come to these understandings.
PN: [Figure 3 about here]

As of now, there is no defined
rubric to guide the evaluation process
undertaken by each commission.
It is impossible to know the extent
to which the commissions vary in
terms of general procedure, interpretation of evidence, and methods
of distilling the piles of evidence into
a rating. What we can see, however,
is the difference among commissions
in terms of the quality of information
they provide to the public.
The discrepancies among commissions in terms of the narratives they
produce are striking. It is of particular importance because these narratives provide the context voters
rely upon when making their voting
choices. Some commissions provide
rich narratives that include background information about the judge
as well as a detailed summary of
both the positive and negative findings derived from the evaluation
process. Other commissions include
only the barest facts.
Some include no information
whatsoever on the findings of the
evaluation, positive or negative,
and beyond the blunt instruction to
“Retain” or “Do Not Retain,” they do
not provide any helpful guidance for
the voter.

Charting a Course for Effective
Commissions

The JPE commission is the key player
in the JPE process. The commission

generally has very few binding rules
to follow and thus has a great deal
of discretion in how to proceed. The
commission is generally given a list
of job performance categories on
which the judges must be evaluated,
as well as a suggested list of information sources. However, it is usually up
to the commission to decide for itself
how to create operational measures
of these job performance categories.
The commissions also decide how
to interpret and weigh the different
pieces of information they collect.
This preliminary investigation
suggests the commissions may be
relying heavily on the attorney
surveys to identify recipients of
negative recommendations. In Colorado, especially, these commissions
are spending a good deal of time collecting additional information, but
it is not clear that this is contributing anything to the ultimate recommendations or narrative summaries
that are the deliverable results of the
deliberation process. Given the well
documented problems with attorney
surveys, 58 this may prove problematic.
The commissions should focus on
improving and standardizing the
constituent parts of the JPE. Performance surveys are centrally created
in Colorado and should be revisited in light of recent scholarship on
attorney surveys in JPE systems. 59
The remaining parts of the process,
however, are left mostly to the discretion of the individual commissions. There is no set protocol for
interviewing the evaluated judges or
others. There is no rubric, of which
we are aware, for evaluating the
merit of the written opinions or trial
court transcripts. It is not clear what
kind of information the judicial selfevaluation solicits, and we have little
sense of the role it plays in the recommendation process. Indeed, we
cannot opine on the propriety of any
of these sources of performance data,
since we have no access to the methodology driving the data collection
process. Although the ABA is probably correct in asserting the need for
confidentiality of the raw data, we
see no similar need for secrecy in the
WWW.AJS.ORG
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evaluation methodology.
The commissions in Colorado
demonstrate a wide variation in the
quality and depth of information they
provide for voters. Each evaluation
results in a summary recommendation about retention. However, some
of the narrative reports provide precious little information to explain
why a particular judge earned a
particular recommendation. This
single-minded focus on the summary
recommendation is problematic.
It seems to betray the stated goal
of providing “information” to the
voters; instead, it simply tells voters
how to vote.
If commissions are going to
produce firm retention recommendations as their output, there is a
strong need for more transparent
and rigorous procedures for interpreting and weighting the various
pieces of evidence in the production
of this recommendation.60 However,
we strongly recommend avoiding this problem by discontinuing
the practice. Although such recommendations are nearly ubiquitous
in state-sponsored JPE programs,
we ought not accept the practice
without serious reflection on the
implications. In states like Colorado,
the commissions produce a narrative
and a retention recommendation
for each judge they evaluate. This
information is then distributed to
the public as widely as the commissions have the capacity to manage.61
When the focus is on the retention
recommendation, the distribution of
this information amounts to a statesponsored commission endorsement
(or not) of a candidate for election.62
This is not to say that the commissions should provide no information or analysis to the voters;
we strongly believe that they must.
Even if we put aside the problem of
confidentiality, it simply would not
do to have the commission narratives be a mere accounting of the raw
data obtained through the various
evaluation components. The voters
are generally laypeople, and they
often lack the specialized knowledge needed to make sense of the
various markers of judicial perfor8 JUDICATURE
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mance. This information needs to
be contextualized for the voters. For
example, it is not enough to say, 85
percent of respondents thought the
judge had an appropriate judicial
temperament. Voters need the commission to define judicial temperament and explain why the attribute
is particularly important for a judge
in a court of law. They need the commission to set this number against
the judge’s peers, as well as against
the judge’s prior performance. If the
judge is flippant about the issue in
an interview or a self-evaluation, the
commission can explain to the voters
why this might prove to be a continuing problem with this judge.
In pursuit of this goal, we suggest
that states devise templates for
their commissions to follow when
writing their narratives and summarizing their findings. These templates should lay out the specific
background information for all narratives to include. Narratives should
include a space for a summary of the
findings for each performance category. In turn, each summary should
indicate the contribution of every
source of information (e.g., attorney surveys, interviews, analysis of
transcripts, etc.). Furthermore, the
template should include a rubric for
determining, for example, how one
judge’s scores on a particular item
are significantly different from the
scores of her peers. The top narrative
in Figure 3 comes much closer to this
ideal than does the bottom one.
Of course, there is a fine line here
between providing interpreted
information and recommending a
specific course of action to the voter.
If the commissions are doing their
jobs, some narratives will read more
positively than others. The information provided by the commissions
should be accessible enough for the
layperson to make up her own mind
but stop somewhere short of simply
telling her how to vote. e
1. Alicia Bannon et al., The New Politics of
Judicial Elections 2011-12: How New Waves of
Special Interest Spending Raised the Stakes for
Fair Courts (2013).

e

V O L 9 8 NO 1

2. David C. Brody, The Use of Judicial Performance Evaluation to Enhance Judicial Accountability, Judicial Independence, and Public Trust, 86
Denv. U. L. Rev. 115, 119 (2008); IAALS, Shared
Expectations: Judicial Accountability in Context,
13-15 (2006).
3. Melinda Gann Hall, Voting in State Supreme
Court Elections: Competition and Context as Democratic Incentives, 69 J. Pol. 1147 (2007).
4. Chris W. Bonneau & Melinda Gann Hall,
In Defense of Judicial 96-103 (2009); Melinda
Gann Hall & Chris W. Bonneau, Does Quality
Matter? Challengers in State Supreme Court Elections, 50 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 20 (2006).
5. William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin, The RollOff Effect in Judicial Retention Elections, 24 Soc.
Sci. J. 417, 424 (1987).
6. Id. at 415; Larry Aspin et al., Thirty Years of
Judicial Retention Elections: An Update, 37 Soc.
Sci. J. 1 (2000).
7. Guidelines for the Evaluation of Judicial
Performance (1985); Guidelines for the Evaluation of Judicial Performance with Commentary
(2005).
8. David C. Brody, The Relationship between
Judicial Performance Evaluations and Judicial
Elections, 87 Judicature 168, 172-173 (2004).
9. Christine M. Durham, Gender and Professional Identity: Unexplored Issues in Judicial
Performance Evaluation 39 Judges’ J. 11, 11-12
(2000).
10. E. Lee Bernick & David J. Pratto, A Behavior-based Evaluation Instrument for Judges, 18 J.
Sys. J. 173 (1995); Kevin M. Esterling, Judicial
Accountability the Right Way, 82 Judicature
206 (1999); Judicial Retention Elections: Do Bar
Association Polls Increase Voter Awareness?, pt.
22 (1985).
11. Penny J. White, Retention Elections in a
Merit-Selection System: Balancing the Will of the
Public with the Need for Judicial Independence
and Accountability: Using Judicial Performance
Evaluations to Supplement Inappropriate Voter
Cues and Enhance Judicial Legitimacy, 74 Mo. L.
Rev. 635 (2009).
12. Richard L. Aynes, Evaluation of Judicial
Performance: A Tool for Self-Improvement, 8 Pepp.
L. Rev. 255 (1981).
13. White, supra note 11, at 652.
14. Penny J. White, Judging Judges: Securing
Judicial Independence by Use of Judicial Performance Evaluations, 29 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1076
(2001).
15. Id. at 1065.
16. Lori W. Nelson & John R. Lund, The Importance of Judicial Evaluations, 26 Utah B. J. 20
(2006).
17. White, supra note 11, at 1075.
18. Seth S. Andersen, Judicial Retention Evaluation Programs, 34 Loy. L. Rev. 1375, 1376 (2000).
19. Anne Rankin Mahoney, Citizen Evaluation
of Judicial Performance: The Colorado Experience,
72 Judicature 210 (1989); Elizabeth Monkus,
Policy Brief: Judicial Evaluation Standards (2013).
20. Id.
21. American Bar Association, Guidelines for
the Evaluation of Judicial Performance (1985);
American Bar Association, Guidelines for the
Evaluation of Judicial Performance with Commentary (2005).
22. Andersen, supra note 18, at 1376 .
23. American Bar Association, Black Letter
Guidelines for the Evaluation of Judicial Performance (2005).
24. Id. at 1.
25. Id. at 4.
26. Id. at 2.
27. Id. at 3-5.
28. Id. at 5.
29. Id. at 5.
30. Id. at 3.
31. Rebecca D. Gill, Sylvia R. Lazos & Mallory

M. Waters, Are Judicial Performance Evaluations
Fair to Women and Minorities? A Cautionary Tale
from Clark County, Nevada, 45 L. & Soc. Rev.
753 (2011); Gary K. Burger, Attorney’s Ratings
of Judges: 1998-2006 (Mound City, MO: Report
to the Mound City Bar, 2007); Joyce S. Sterling,
The Impact of Gender Bias on Judging: Survey of
Attitudes Toward Women Judges, 22 Co. Law.
257 (1993).
32. Brody, supra note 2, at 31.
33. Sharon Paynter & Richard C. Kearney,
Who Watches the Watchmen? Evaluating Judicial
Performance in the American States, 41 Admin. &
Soc. 923 (2010).
34. State of Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation, Judicial Performance Fact
Sheet, 1 (2012) http://www.coloradojudicialperformance.gov/documents/factsheet.pdf (last
visited Aug. 26, 2012).
35. Mahoney, supra note 19.
36. American Bar Association, Guidelines for
the Evaluation of Judicial Performance (1985);
American Bar Association, Guidelines for the
Evaluation of Judicial Performance with Commentary (2005).
37. The Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation website houses this information. Seewww.coloradojudicialperformance.gov.
38. The recommendation of “No Opinion” is
only utilized when the commissions are unable
to reach a consensus on a judge or if there is
not enough information to make an informed
decision.
39. Mahoney, supra note 19, at 212.
40. Kevin M. Esterling & Kathleen M.
Sampson, Judicial Retention Evaluation Programs in Four States: A Report with Recommendations (1998).
41. These changes are reflected in the “Rules
Governing Commissions on Judicial Performance,” which can be found here: www.coloradojudicialperformance.gov/documents/Rules.
pdf.
42. The official Fact Sheet published by the
Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation notes
that between 1990 and 2012 a total of 29 out of
1,176 evaluations resulted in “Do Not Retain” or
“No Opinion” recommendations. We know that
nine of these happened in the 623 recommendations made between 2002 and 2012. This means
that the positive recommendation rate between
1990 and 2002 was approximately 96.4%. The
Fact Sheet is available at http://www.coloradojudicialperformance.gov/documents/factsheet.
pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2012).
43. Supra n. 35, at 4.
44. State of Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation, http://www.coloradojudicialperformance.gov/retention.cfm?ret=94
(last visited June 21, 2014).
45. State of Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation, available at (last visited June
21, 2014).
46. Rule 5(a), Supra n. 43, at 3.
47. American Bar Association, Guidelines for
the Evaluation of Judicial Performance with Commentary, 3 (2005).
48. Rule 10(c), Supra n. 43, at 5.
49. Rules 10(f) and 11(f), Supra n. 43, at 5-6.
50. Rebecca D. Gill & Kenneth J. Retzl, Implicit
Gender Bias in State-Sponsored Judicial Performance Evaluations: A Preliminary Analysis of Colorado’s JPE System, 2002-2012, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2270376. The data collection process
and summary statistics for the model are laid
out in detail in the manuscript.
51. In addition to these pre-election evaluations, the state commission has been conducting
interim evaluations of appellate court judges
since 2009; a total of 165 interim evaluations
were completed between 2009 and 2012. These
interim evaluations do not include retention

WWW.AJS.ORG

e

JUDICATURE 9

recommendations, although the results are
available to the public through the official
website: http://www.coloradojudicialperformance.gov.
52. For county and district court judges, attorneys are asked if they believe a judge is biased
toward the prosecution or defense. To create a
measure of bias, the aggregate percentages of
attorneys who believed the judge to be biased
were offset against each other to obtain a net
bias score. This score was folded on itself such
that higher levels of bias toward either the
prosecution or the defense are closer to the
maximum value of 1, and less bias is closer to the
minimum value of zero.
53. Gill et al., supra note 31.
54. Jennifer K. Elek et al., Judicial Performance
Evaluation: Steps to Improve Survey Process
and Measurement, 95 Judicature 65 (2012);
Rebecca Gill, Implicit Bias in Judicial Performance
Evaluations: We Must Do Better than This, J. Sys.
J. (2014).
55. Rebecca D. Gill & Kenneth J. Retzl, Implicit
Gender Bias in State-Sponsored Judicial Performance Evaluations: A Preliminary Analysis of
Colorado’s JPE System, 2002-2012 (2013); Joyce
S. Sterling, The Impact of Gender Bias on Judging:
Survey of Attitudes Toward Women Judges, 22 Co.
L. Rev. 257 (1993).
56. Aspin et al., SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL,
(2000); William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin, The
Roll-Off Effect in Judicial Retention Elections, 24
see id. at 415 (1987); Bonneau & Hall, supra
note 4, at 85.
57. In fact, there was one county judge in 2004
whose attorney recommendation to retain was a
full 54 percent below the county judge average,
and the judge still managed to receive a recommendation to retain from the commission.
58. Elek et al., supra note 54; Christine M.
Durham, Gender and Professional Identity: Unexplored Issues in Judicial Performance Evaluation,
39 Judges’ J. 13 (2000); Gill et al., supra note 31;
Gill, supra note 54; Jacqueline R. Griffin, Judging
the Judges, 21 Lit. 5 (1994).
59. Elek et al., supra note 54; Gill, supra note
54.
60. Rebecca Wood & Sylvia R. Lazos, Reflections in Response to the Nevada Judicial Education Pilot Project (Dec. 18, 2009).
61. Michael B. Dann & Randall M. Hansen,
Judicial Retention Elections, 34 Loy. L. Rev. 1429
(2001); A. John Pelander, Judicial Performance
Review in Arizona: Goals, Practical Effects and
Concerns, 30 Ariz. St. L.J. 643 (1998); White,
supra note 11.
62. Rebecca D. Gill, Beyond High Hopes and
Unmet Expectations: Judicial Selection Reforms in
the States, 96 Judicature 278 (2013).

Rebecca D. Gill
is Assistant Professor of Political
Science at the University of Nevada,
Las Vegas.

Kenneth J. Retzl
is Ph.D. candidate in Political Science
at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas.

10 JUDICATURE

e

JULY / AUGUST 2014

e

V O L 9 8 NO 1

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
mean

All Judges 2002-2012
sd
min
max

Trial Court Judges 2002-2012
mean
sd
min
max

n

n

“Do Not Retain” Recommend					

5					

5

“No Opinion” Recommend					

4					

4

“Retain” Recommend					

614					

579

Attorney Retain Score

621

88.95

11.03

35.00

100.00

586

Attorney Bias Scale						

0.34

0.23

0.00

1.00

478

Layperson Retain						

89.13

8.92

50.00

100.00

590

88.83

10.81

35.00

100.00

Critical New Stories

0.13

0.34

0.00

11.00

623

0.11

0.64

0.00

11.00

588

Time Since Bar Admit

27.01

7.49

3.00

46.00

612

27.77

7.48

3.00

46.00

577

Years on Bench

9.47

7.39

1.00

38.00

622

9.61

7.45

1.00

38.00

587

Number of Reversals

1.34

3.45

0.00

31.00

623

1.06

2.52

0.00

22.00

588

Law School Prestige

2.81

1.08

1.00

6.00

620

2.86

1.08

1.00

6.00

585

In-State JD Degree

0.53

0.50

0.00

1.00

619

0.54

0.50

0.00

1.00

584

Female Judge

0.26

0.44

0.00

1.00

623

0.27

0.44

0.00

1.00

588
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Table 2. Bivariate Analyses of Commission Recommendations and
Various Explanations
	Mean	Mean
Explanation
Positive	Negative
Attorney Retain Score

n	Significance

89.09

71.33

621

t = -4.99

p = 0.000 ***

0.34

0.55

478

t = 2.45

p = 0.007 **

89.25

82.89

590

t = -2.13

p = 0.017 *

Critical News Stories

0.12

0.56

623

t = 1.14

p = 0.142

Time Since Bar Admit

27.04

24.67

612

t = -2.63

p = 0.012 **

Years on Bench

9.47

9.11

622

t = -0.15

p = 0.442

Reversals

1.70

0.60

495

t = -1.76

p = 0.929

Law School Prestige

2.81

3.00

620

χ2(5) = 8.19

p = 0.146

53.77

33.33

619

χ2(1) = 1.49

p = 0.222

623

χ2(1) = 7.57

p = 0.006 **

Attorney Bias Scale
Layperson Retain Score

In-State JD

Female Judge			

The number of observations differs among these variables because 1) the pieces of information collected for appellate and district judges are
different, and 2) the difficulty in finding suitable sources of biographical information for judges no longer sitting on the bench.

Table 3. Logistic Regression Predicting Positive Commission
Recommendations
Model of Positive Commission Recommendation (Trial Courts)
	Odds Ratio

Robust Std. Err.

z

p > |z|

Attorney Retain Score

1.079

0.023

3.57

Attorney Bias Scale

0.652

0.671

-0.42

0.000 ***
0.678

Layperson Retain Score

1.033

0.051

0.64

0.519

Critical News Stories

0.552

0.197

-1.66

0.096

Time Since Bar Admit

0.960

0.057

-0.68

0.498

Years on Bench

1.006

0.046

0.14

0.889

Reversals

1.551

0.957

0.71

0.477

Law School Prestige

0.894

0.348

-0.29

0.744

In-State JD

3.591

3.184

1.32

0.188

Female Judge

0.147

0.137

-2.06

0.040 *

Constant

0.045

0.187

-0.74

0.459

Logistic regression with clustered standard errors. n = 574 observations, standard errors clustered over 348 individual judges. Wald χ2 = 91.16
***, Pseudo R2 = 0.2922. Correctly Classified: 98.26%. These findings are robust to the inclusion of appellate court judges, which requires
removal of the layperson Retain score (as this information is not collected for appellate court judges).
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Figure 1. Commission Districts and Negative Recommendations

Figure 2. Predicted Probability of Positive Recommendation with 90%
Confidence
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Figure 1. Two JPE Commission Narratives from 2012
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